Video Transcript

>> ANNOUNCER: Please welcome Program Committee Chair, RSA Conference, Hugh Thompson.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Hey, everybody. Hello. Wow. Good afternoon. RSA Conference 2023, how has it been?

(Cheers)

Okay. Excellent. Excellent. Excellent. And one more round of applause for DJ Shiftee. That was incredible. That was incredible.

(Applause)

Just one memorable quote from that was ChatGPT can be your dating wingman. I'm like, oh, I wonder what session that was from? I'm not sure. Bit incredible compilation.

And I wanted to just start off by saying thank you. Thank you for being here. Thank you for sharing. Thanks for all the discussions and participation. You could just feel the energy this week of more than 40,000 of you, 40,000 coming together, sharing. Absolutely incredible.

And we have an amazing show for you this evening. I am just absolutely thrilled by our guests, by the topic. You notice this is the Quantum Edition of the Hugh Thompson Show, our first ever, maybe not our last, actually, on this topic.

You may have also noticed a conspicuously lighted DeLorean at the back, or you may not have noticed it. And I will tell you that Christopher Lloyd is in the building right now, as we speak.

(Applause)

I got back to my hotel room at I want to say, like, 11:00 or something last night, and I couldn't resist. I watched Back to the Future 1 again for, like, the 180th time probably. Just so iconic. And we've got two other incredible guests to explore quantum, which has been an interesting topic this week. It has profound implications to some of the cryptographic permittance that we all rely on. And so, we're going to talk about that and we're going to talk about a whole bunch of other things in just a little while. It is going to be a terrific show.

But before we get started, I wanted to share with you a personal security story just to set a little bit of context, and this is something that happened about I want to say just over two years ago, so the beginning of 2021. I'm going and, you know, getting the mail, and I see in the mail there's a USPS priority envelope. So, I'm like, well, somebody paid some good money to send this quick, so let me open it up. And inside, there were two fascinating objects.

So, let's show the first one, which is a check for almost $3,000, right, $2,930. So, it certainly piqued my interest. And it came with a set of instructions, and we have them up here as well. And you'll see at the top left, it's got, you know, agent number, right, so it's got some intrigue to it. And then it goes on to talk about, hey, here's this check. What we need you to do is deposit it in your bank or cash it right away, and then we want you to go your local Walmart and buy a whole bunch of gift cards, and it gives you instructions about how to buy them. And, like, if somebody says why are you buying all those gift cards, what do you tell them? It's like, oh, my family really loves Walmart, you know, those kinds of things.

Immediately, I recognized what this is. It's something called a secret shopper scam. Now, I'm sure some of you may be aware of this, some of you may not be aware of this, and may be planning to go to Walmart shortly if you receive one. Do not do it. Do not follow the instructions of this thing. What happens is, ultimately, the check doesn't get processed, and you're on the hook for the payment for these gift cards at Walmart. You scratch off the back, you send the pictures and text them to the criminal, and then they use the funds. So, it's a very, very common scam.

There's a friend of mine in the U.S. Postal Inspection Service that once showed me tractor trailer loads of these thing, so I know this is a really common thing. So, I'm not too worried about it. You know, I'm in cyber, but I'm pretty paranoid. But I know that a lot of people get these things. So, fine.

However, over the next two days, we started to get dozens and dozens and dozens of these things, and now I'm starting to get a little bit worried. Have I been identified as particularly gullible for this kind of stuff? You know, is there somebody else in the house, right, like one of the kids? But then I'm like, geez, these kids are, you know, too young to even ‑‑ some of them even to read or write, so it's probably unlikely that they're the targets. And then I take out the envelope that I originally opened. I think we've got a picture of it. I've got it -- one of them right here. The other several hundred now are at the house. And what happened is that this was actually intended for another person. So, it was addressed to somebody else, and it was folks all over the country, but the return address was my house.

(Laughter)

So, I'm thinking about this for a little while. And while I wasn't originally concerned, now I start to get hyper-concerned. Right? You know, first, am I being targeted? Right? It's a natural thing that you would think. But then the real threat started to manifest in my head, which is, well, wait a minute, if we are getting some returned ones, and my guess is, you know, this is hopefully a diligent crew of cyber criminals that sent this stuff out, that they're not sending them to random addresses, so we're probably seeing, like, some tiny fraction of undeliverable ones. What about the maybe 10,000 to 20,000 of them that actually got to real victims, maybe they went to Walmart, maybe they got the gift cards, and now maybe they realize they're out, like, $3,000 of their own money. Who are they going to come after? Right? Probably the person at that return address. And so, I wanted to be fairly calm about this as I explained it to my wife, and, like, look, if you see any suspicious cars or, you know, anybody angry on the street, and I put in a bunch more security cameras.

 

But I bring this up, A, because it was terrifying and it's therapeutically helpful for me to share it with you, but, B, the problem here was the design point around physical mail. When you write a letter to somebody, for example, you can put whatever you want in the return address, Santa Claus, North Pole, Christopher Lloyd, the future, whatever, and you just assume that, like, whatever you wrote up there, the recipient assumes that it came from that individual.

Unfortunately, our first pass at email was based on the same concept, right, the SMTP protocol. Again, you could say that you're sending this thing from anywhere. We then tried to layer security on top of these things to add digital trust. And how did we do it? We did it mostly through certificates and signing and then through DMARC and DKIM. But what would happen if one day all of these compensating mechanisms for digital trust, all of these signatures that we used to verify firmware, that we use to verify signed documents, that we use to verify binaries, what if that cryptography could be broken? And that is a real possibility with quantum computing.

So, today, we are going to explore that topic. Not all gloom and doom. There are some positive things to quantum computers, you know, developing. And with that, I would like to welcome my first guest, an amazing, amazingly accomplished physicist. She's a Professor of Physics at Wilfrid Laurier University. Please welcome Shohini Ghose.

Hey, Shohini. Thanks so much for being here.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Nice to meet you.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Please, have a seat. Have a seat.

So, first, thanks for making the time for this.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Glad to be here.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: You have studied quantum computing for a very long time. Actually, contributed very heavily to the field. I wanted to ask you to just please, if you could, in under two minutes, explain a very complicated topic of what is a quantum computer in a way that is completely exhaustive and very, very easy to understand. Go.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: No problem. I'll just get ChatGPT to do it.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Ah. It actually would probably do a good job. Okay. Please. I'm going to go with a real professional.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Yeah. So, quantum computing is actually not one more step in our, you know, normal computing progress map. It's a whole different type of computing. It's a different framework. And one way I like to think about it is to compare a candle and a light bulb, or a horse and carriage versus a car or rocket ship even, because those are all technologies that have maybe a similar goal, making light or getting from point A to point B, but they use very, very different scientific models to do it. You cannot build a better light bulb or even any light bulb by building better candles. And similarly, you cannot build a quantum computer just by building better and better regular computers because the mathematics of computing itself is different, meaning our normal zero- and one-bit approach, which is really a great approach to computing if you think about it. It's kind of simple, easy to understand.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: We like it. Yeah.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: And it's been working pretty well.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: It's been working pretty good. Yeah. Yeah. It gave us ChatGPT.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: There you go. I don't know if that's working well.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: All right. We'll defer that topic.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: But, actually, thinking in binary with just a zero or a one is actually pretty limiting. It turns out, if you broaden the framework to include probabilities of a particular object, your fundamental information holder, which we call a bit -- but in quantum, we call it a qubit for quantum bit -- a qubit can have a probability of being a zero or a probability of being a one, and we don't know whether it is a zero or a one, which seems like it would be really not precise to do computing with that, but it's actually an extra knob, and it allows us to broaden how to think of computing itself, to cleverly maneuver through this what we call a superposition of zero and one, to be able to explore a much larger landscape and do better algorithms. That's quantum computing.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: It's such a fascinating concept, and so hard to get your head around because there's not a lot of normal analogs. People used the partially dead cat in a black box like this, and it's only alive or dead when you open it. But the application of it, as you say, exploring many paths at once, is fascinating. What are the applications or potential applications of quantum computers? What can they do for us?

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Well, once you start embracing this bigger approach to computing, you want to do the same kind of tasks, such as you want to do calculations faster, you want to be able to apply it to all of the big global challenges, such as health care or climate change. And it turns out that using quantum‑based algorithms, we may be able to do things like search through large datasets much faster, and that has huge numbers of possible applications, such as analyzing climate data or looking at financial data. And anything where, you know, data processing has a role to play, that would be where we could use these kinds of algorithms.

But also very exciting is the idea of quantum simulation. I'll use a bit of an analogy to give you an idea of why it might be better to use quantum computers. So, think of somebody gives you a Lego box and says use the pieces in the Lego box to make a nice soccer ball. Okay. But, you know, Lego boxes don't usually have rounded kinds of pieces, so you've got to be really clever and put together all the pieces to kind of make a nice spherical shape, but it's not quite right because you can't get a nice, round piece. But what if you had a Lego box which was bigger and you had round pieces in there, too, right, curved surfaces. If you put that together, you could make that same soccer ball but with less pieces and better.

So, Quantum computers are kind of like that. If you wanted to do simulations of molecules, which are electrons and atoms, and try to describe and analyze every quantum property, then, of course, a toolbox, which also works on quantum principles, which is what the quantum computer would be, that's the better Lego box. So, we could use those kinds of approaches to do simulations better, for drug development, for better development of, let's say, solar cells, or anything where you're doing any kind of materials design. Quantum sensors could be improved. So, there's all kinds of interesting possibilities. Not all of them are positive, and I'm sure you're going to bring that up at some point.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: So, one of the topics we've been talking about this week, which is something, obviously, you're very familiar with, is some algorithms that we believe theoretically might be able to break some of the asymmetric cryptography that we're using, you know, all over the place, like Shores algorithm. And I'd say an open question in the mind of a lot of people is how should we think about how far along quantum computers are today? Like, where might we be in ten years? Your guess would be way better than ours. So, how far along are we, and where might we get to, when do you think?

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: I'm not sure if my guess would be much better because anybody who tries to predict technology always gets it wrong. Right?

>> HUGH THOMPSON: We won't hold you to it. It's not like we're going to replay this in ten years, Shohini, you said ten years ago.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: It's a good question. And, yeah, thank you for not holding me to it, but I'll give it a guess. We know now that, you know, companies like IBM and Google and others, everybody now has a roadmap of how they're developing this technology. I'll say right now, we only have what we call small‑scale computers, quantum computers, that are great for prototyping and benchmarking, but they are not able to do any kind of problem that current computers can already do pretty well. So, we're not there yet.

And the other problem is that these computers are really, really noisy, meaning there's all kinds of errors happening all the time. And that's really important. Just like, you know, our regular computers also, of course, have errors. The only reason all of our emails work the way they're supposed to is because there's always error correction happening in the background. So, the same thing applies for quantum computers. We'd have to do error correction to make these computers work perfectly. The problem is that error correction is much harder on a quantum computer, and the errors occur if these computers using current technology if they heat up, kind of like our regular computers, except quantum computers have to be kept at temperatures colder than outer space. So, that's a much, much stricter rule. And so, currently, no company is actually doing quantum error correction. Although, in principle, we have a theoretical framework that allows us to do it, we don't have those kinds of computers being rolled out as yet. So, given all those challenges, I'd say probably a decade from now, there's I'd say a 60% chance of getting a --

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Okay.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: -- robust, scalable quantum computer.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Okay. So, material -- it's not like a 0.01% chance.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: No. There's a good chance, which is exactly why governments are very interested. Security standards have to be changed, companies are racing forward, and there's, you know, billions being invested. All of that gives you some idea of where this is going.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: So, it's good to know. So, it's not something me and my kids could build in my basement because we've recently gotten access to funding somehow, a lot of checks have come into the home recently. So, we don't have a zero‑degree Kelvin environment, so this wouldn't be something we could build.

I wanted to ask you about another just incredibly important piece of work that you've been doing around bringing women into physics and highlighting the work of women in physics. And, you know, we were talking on the phone a few weeks ago, and I was just blown away by how many discoveries in physics actually were powered by a team of a couple of men who may have been the ones that things were named after, and then some incredibly intelligent women. So, if you could just talk about that, that would be great.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Sure. You're absolutely right. Almost all of the major discoveries in physics ‑‑ and not just physics, of course, but I focus in physics -- almost all of them have involved women, whether you're talking about the Big Bang or Dark Matter, the discovery of dark matter, or absolutely quantum physics, you know, this whole field of entanglement, which the Nobel Prize was awarded just last year for the people who did the first experiments. Three men got the Nobel Prize for their experiments; however, the very first experiment that actually was able to observe entanglement between pairs of photons, which are particles of light, was a woman named Chien-Shiung, and that is often ignored. She certainly ‑‑ actually, while she did that and many other experiments, she never got the Nobel Prize. All of that credit was given to men. This is such a common effect that has a name. It's called the Matilda Effect.

So, unfortunately, this is not something that is getting much better. But one of the things I like to do is try to correct the story. And I've recently written a book about all these discoveries and contributions that women in physics and astronomy have made, and it is available for preorder.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: What's the name of the book?

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: The name is Her Space, Her Time.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Her Space, Her Time. Okay. Great. It sounds like -- it almost sounds like a focus hidden figures type of a book.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: It is, actually.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Which was amazing. It was fascinating.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: That's exactly -- in fact, that's what the blurb says.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Oh, okay. Okay. There you go.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Thank you for that.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: No, no, no. I'm looking forward to reading it. Shohini, thank you so much for being here. Thanks for your contributions. And thanks for everything you've done. Really appreciate it.

>> SHOHINI GHOSE: Thank you.

(Applause)

>> HUGH THOMPSON: I'd like to welcome up our next guest who is no stranger to this audience. He is such an accomplished cryptographer, but I guess the only thing that eclipses his accomplishments in his cryptography is his unbelievable humility. In fact, you saw him earlier this week when he won the RSA Conference Prize for Excellence in the Field of Mathematics. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Paul Kocher.

Hey, Paul. How's it going? Good to see you, man. Have a seat. Have a seat. I like the walk‑on music. It's like a superhero kind of music.

>> PAUL KOCHER: That's good music.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Did you set that up?

>> PAUL KOCHER: No.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Okay. All right. All right. All right. I digress. I digress. Paul, it is always so great to talk to you. I know, I know, I've been guilty of ‑‑ you've been an Innovation Sandbox judge for many years, a program that we did on Monday, and I've often called you the Simon Cowell of Innovation Sandbox because you have very sharp questions for folks, very good, intelligent, questions. But you're inherently an optimist, despite those questions, I know, and I wanted to ask you how real is this concern or this threat around public key cryptography, quantum computers. And what are your thoughts on when we might get to a quantum ‑‑ a cryptographically relevant quantum computer?

>> PAUL KOCHER: Well, so let me -- I should peel back the onion a little bit and then try to put the onion back together. That was a bad analogy.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: No, I like it. I like it. Put it back together.

>> PAUL KOCHER: There's a lot of hype around quantum computing. There are announcements in the paper it seems like every week of somebody pushing something forward, and that's really important work, but the thing that our community worries about is the arrival of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer -- that was the phrase that you used -- and that's a quantum computer that has three main properties. One is it's got the generality or the power to actually break crypto, and it has to have the scale needed to do it and has to have the stability needed to do it. And we don't really have any of those pieces put together in a way that has any threat to current cryptography, but we're afraid that might happen. It's probably not ‑‑ I think I'm a little more pessimistic than Shohini was. But even if it's a 10% or 20% chance in the next 10 or 15 years, that's enough that we still have to go and respond to it.

The other kind of maybe more cynical aspect of it is that we have to deal with it. We're getting requirements. The requirements are coming from a good place -- sorry, from the right mindset -- that we have to go secure our systems. So, even if we're not sure whether it's 50%, or 10%, or even 3%, the consequence if it comes and we're not prepared is huge. All of our public key algorithms fail. We lose RSA. We lose ECDSA. We lose [indiscernible 00:24:26]. We lose everything. So, on the public key side.

The symmetric side, we're actually okay. Quantum computers do have a technique. It's called Grover's Algorithm. It will let somebody break, yes, a little bit faster, but if you use 256-bit keys or security parameters, completely fine there. So, the symmetric side, it's a sort of, you know, upgrade in the same way that maybe DES to AES was. But on the public key side, we're off in uncharted territory without really any kind of a good roadmap for where we're supposed to go.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Well, let me ask you. So much of, I call it digital trust today, is based on these asymmetric algorithms, like, for example, signing your firmware and checking it. Right? Asymmetric. It's a public key that's stored maybe in hardware. And there's many other things like the transactions on the web. You were the designer, the co‑designer, of SSL, so you would definitely know about that. I'm curious how long would it take us to replace our current infrastructure with a better one? NIST has obviously been running this competition around new algorithms and lattice space. What does this mean? What should we do right now? Should we, like, run out of the room and start, like, replacing these algorithms?

>> PAUL KOCHER: Well, yes, we need to replace algorithms. The question of how long, it's actually hard to say because we haven't really ever finished a transition. MD-5 is still being used. Single DES is still being used.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Which, I might add, that this gentleman helped to get decertified as you developed an architecture with Deep Crack to break DES very quickly.

>> PAUL KOCHER: That was so long ago.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Thanks for that, man. That took many hours of my life, and many people here.

>> PAUL KOCHER: So, there's two things, though, that we should do now. So, there's some things we have I'm going to say present threat, but there's two things we've got to do now. One is there are a few kinds of signing keys that have kind of very long-term requirements. We can't upgrade them. So, if you're building a chip and you want to sign the firmware that's going to be loaded into it, that key is really, really hard to change. Like you can't change chips once they're in people's hands. So, those keys need to be replaced with something that's quantum resistant. Actually, that's kind of one of the bright spots. We have these hash‑based signatures. They're super well understood. They're super robust. They're very fast on the verifying side. They're a little messy on the signing side. But you don't sign, hopefully, that many firmware images. Please, I hope. So, that's one area where we have a pretty clear roadmap of what to do.

The other area that is the one of information with long‑term privacy requirements, and there are a surprising number of those, and some of them are in the private sector, some are in the government sector. I mean, just to give an example. Long ago, 1940s, the Soviets reused some of their one‑time pads, which you're never supposed to do. You shouldn't use one‑time pads, anyway. But using one‑time pads and reusing them was kind of two mistakes.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: That's against the definition of a one‑time pad.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Yes. And so, they were using two‑time pads -- 1942 to 1945. U.S. captured some of the message. The armory signals the intelligence service, started analyzing them. They kept analyzing those until about 1980 and didn't declassify the work until, I think, 1995. So, you're looking at, you know, 50 years of secrecy around those kinds of communications. And when you look at a protocol, take SSL as an example because I'm responsible for its mistakes, I have no idea what information might go over that protocol. There are people who are using it to watch, you know, the latest comedy. There are people who are using it to send their most sensitive information around. The same protocol has to work for everything. The protocol isn't aware of whether your information is important or not, so we have to harden the whole infrastructure.

Actually, do you want the good news or the bad news?

>> HUGH THOMPSON: I definitely want the good. After all of that, I want the good news first.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Okay. You're in such a good mood. Let's prolong that for just a little bit here.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Please.

>> PAUL KOCHER: I mean, the good news is that, you know, NIST has run this process. They did a great job on the process in terms of the structure. They haven't done a great job at everything. So, when I say they've done a great job, it's not that I love NIST, it's just that this one, and some of the others, they've done a really, really great job. We've got some recommendations from them. We've got algorithms that are fast, they're free, you can put them into protocols, and so long as they actually end up being robust, we can just switch over to them and we're all good.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Okay. That's great. Thank you, Paul. Thanks for being here and joining ‑‑ okay. No. All right. Go ahead. What's the bad news? Yeah, go ahead.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Well, the bad news is the switchover is kind of like doing a brain transplant.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Oh, my ‑‑ I thought you would get to parity where like the good news was good and then the bad news was equally as bad.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Well, it's actually kind of worse than that. The DES to AES upgrade, at least the brains were the same size. And we also have to do -- for a lot of -- so, for TLS and a few protocols, you can negotiate, so you can upgrade one end and then the other later. But for the long tail of protocols, they don't have this ability, so you have to upgrade everything simultaneously or else you end up with incompatibilities, and we don't know how to really do this.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: This is a great ending note.

>> PAUL KOCHER: You put me between Shohini who was like so charismatic and bubbly, and you've got Christopher Lloyd afterwards. You kind of messed the show planning up here.

(Laughter).

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Thank you. Thank you further for your commentary.

>> PAUL KOCHER: The other problem, too, like, we want to use hybrid modes. You want to use a current crypto, because so long as quantum computers don't have a breakthrough, it seems to be okay, and we also want to use the quantum‑resistant algorithms, but we're scared that there could be problems with those. Of the kind of late finalist, we had two fail catastrophically. We had Rainbow and Psych both get broken with like, you know, not even require chrono computer breaks, like, you know, Hours on a laptop level break.

So, the ones that we've got coming out that are based on lattices, they may be okay. But if you really care a lot about security, you don't want to put all your eggs in that basket, either. And we don't have standards for how to do these hybrid modes, so it's kind of messy.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Okay. Okay. Okay. Paul, so based on that collection of things, right, so Shohini puts it at 60% in ten years, you put it at less than that, right, there is also this other factor of the NSA has come out and published some dates that you have to move to these quantum‑resistant algorithms or else, power of the purse, you know, we're not going to buy technology that has it in it. What do you recommend knowing how long it takes to replace some of these use cases? The folks in here are running security for major companies, countries. What do you recommend that they do now?

>> PAUL KOCHER: Well, I'm going to get in trouble with some of the cryptographers to say this, but the first thing to worry about is actually not this problem. If the worst thing in the world were the threat of quantum computing, and that was the only threat we had to worry about, I would be so happy. And if I could swap the world where that was the only thing, I would push that button and go for it. So, the bugs in software are still, you know, the main issue, the human error.

So, when you look at these upgrades, the question then is can you do it in a way where you help with those risks, too, or do you make those risks worse? So, if you do a panic kind of let's kind of stick some Band-Aids and graft an extra brain on the side of this organism and send it out in the world, that's probably going to put you in a worse space than if you didn't do it. But on the other hand, if you can take your legacy C code and rewrite it in a memory‑safe language and use modern tools and actually do some static analysis and understand your systems better, you're going to get these multiplying benefits of dealing with this and modernizing.

So, if you can be in that space, that's great. We're going to get long‑term benefits from that. That long tail I talked about has a lot of other exposures, too. So, energy going into inventory algorithms. You've got doing basic hygiene. You know, these things are going to pay off, and we should be doing them anyway, and this is an extra motivation to do that.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: So, it sounds like don't try and put the band‑aids on, but try and start the home renovation as soon as possible.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Absolutely.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Okay.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Absolutely. And ten years is not that long.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: No, it's not that long.

>> PAUL KOCHER: It sounds like it's so long that you'll be in another job by then. But if you're actually looking at the number, like, getting the key management systems upgraded and getting the hardware designs changed, and you start looking at everything, it's going to be really, really hard to be anywhere close to done when that timeline is out.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Well, Paul, thank you for that uplifting and inspiring discussion. But honestly, I just wanted to thank you for the amazing contributions that you've made in this space. If you look through the laundry list of things that you've done and the ways that you've made us better, it is profound.

>> PAUL KOCHER: The number of vacations I've ruined.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: That's true, too.

>> PAUL KOCHER: An amazing week here. Thank you very much for organizing this show and the program here. It's been great. Thank you.

>> HUGH THOMPSON: Thanks for being a part of it, Paul. Appreciate it.

>> PAUL KOCHER: Thanks.