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Smart Grid Security: A Look to the Future

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 #RSAC

Overview

- ◆ Distributed Energy
- ◆ Plug-in Vehicles
- ◆ Evolving Threats: Market Manipulation, Cascading Failure Modes




Distributed Generation: Cybersecurity Threats and Vulnerabilities #RSAC

- ◆ Depends on a sophisticated communications infrastructure to be always available
 - ◆ Needs instantaneous information
 - ◆ Often widely dispersed
 - ◆ May leverage public networks



Distributed Generation: Cybersecurity Threats and Vulnerabilities #RSAC

- ◆ Integrity of Information is Critical
 - ◆ Using complex algorithms
 - ◆ Tampering with or errors in algorithms can lead to power outages
 - ◆ Protection of the software supply chain will be critical



Distributed Generation: Cybersecurity Threats and Vulnerabilities #RSAC

- ◆ Do-It-Yourself Generation
 - ◆ Not really new
 - ◆ Potential for manipulation
 - ◆ Analogous to BotNet networks



Plug-In Vehicles: Grid to Vehicle

- ◆ Plug-in vehicles will require significant instrumentation and data reporting
 - ◆ Utilities will need feedback from vehicles to predict demand
 - ◆ Privacy concerns
 - ◆ Charging stations need trusted communications
 - ◆ More monitoring of traditional grid components
 - ◆ Communication with vehicle over home area network (HAN)




Distributed Generation: Cybersecurity Threats and Vulnerabilities ^{#RSAC}

- ◆ Public Charging and Roaming
 - ◆ Payment systems for charging
 - ◆ Should someone be able to roam and use their vehicle's identification number like cell phones or simply pay owner of facility without utility involved?
 - ◆ Potential for fraud and privacy issues; tax collection




Plug-In Vehicles: Vehicle to Grid

- ◆ The Potential for Energy Storage
 - ◆ Potential boon for utilities
 - ◆ Sell back electricity
 - ◆ Need strong analytics




Plug-In Vehicles: Vehicle to Grid

- ◆ Cybersecurity Challenges
 - ◆ Similar to “do-it-yourself generation”
 - ◆ Vehicle identifiers
 - ◆ Privacy
 - ◆ Potential for malfunctioning vehicles to disrupt grid
 - ◆ Need a mini balancing authority




Evolving Threats: Market Manipulation, Cascading Failure Modes



NIST Smart Grid Framework 1.0 January 2010

NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology



Evolving Threats: Market Manipulation

- ◆ Market Manipulation
 - ◆ With distributed energy resources come exchanges to buy and sell energy
 - ◆ Markets can be manipulated by obtaining generation capabilities and demand data before it is available to the general market
 - ◆ Data can be manipulated to influence markets
 - ◆ Keeping humans involved is critical



Evolving Threats: Cascading Failure Modes

- ◆ Cascading Failure Modes
 - ◆ We have limited information of the failure modes
 - ◆ Can sensor feeds, at a high enough volume, overwhelm a system?
 - ◆ Will automation and safety protocols lead to unintended consequences
 - ◆ Yuma, Arizona, incident
 - ◆ Automated controls often need human sanity checks



Key Takeaways

- ◆ For Utilities
 - ◆ Build your architecture to support cybersecurity for future innovation
 - ◆ Assume manufacturers of consumer products won't build in adequate security
 - ◆ When creating new markets, assume someone will look to exploit them
 - ◆ Be prepared to operate in a world where you have less control
- ◆ For Residential and Business Customers
 - ◆ Don't assume the utility can protect you from whatever you connect to the grid
 - ◆ Demand that product vendors spell out how security is implemented
 - ◆ Always have a manual override and analog gauges available

Questions?

Thank You.

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