If SSL is the emperor’s new clothes, then Ivan Ristic in Bulletproof SSL and TLS has shown that perhaps the emperor isn't wearing anything at all. There is a perception that if a web site is SSL secured, then it’s indeed secure. Read a few pages in this important book, and the SSL = security myth is dispelled.
For the first 8 of the 16 chapters, Ristic, one of the greatest practical SSL./TLS experts around, spends 230 pages showing countless weaknesses, vulnerabilities, attacks and other SSL weaknesses. He then spends the next 8 chapters showing how SSL can, if done correctly, be deployed to provide adequate security.
One would think that it’s impossible to write an interesting book about a security protocol. But for those who use SSL or just want to understand what it’s all about, the book is not only quite practical, but a very interesting read.
The book provides a good balance of overview, protocol details, summary of vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and a large chunk of practical deployment guidance.
The first three chapters provide an excellent overview to SSL, TLS, PKI and cryptography. While chapter 2 may be a bit dry, the introduction is thorough and comprehensive.
Chapter 4 is particularly interesting in that the author notes that while the cryptography behind SSL and PKI is fundamentally secure, there is an inherent flaw in how PKI operates, in that any CA (certificate authority) is able to issue a certificate for any name without have to seek approval from the domain name owner. This trust dependency creates numerous attack vectors that can be exploited.
The chapter details a number of significant incidents that arose from this flaw, from the 2001 code signing certificate mistake; where Verisign mistakenly issued Class 3 code signing certificates to someone claiming to be a Microsoft employee, to the Flame malware, which was signed with a bogus certificate that was seemingly signed by Microsoft, to a number of other issues.
In chapter 5, the book details a number of HTTP and browser issues, and related TLS threats. Attacks such as sidejacking, cookie stealing, cookie manipulation and more are detailed.
The author wisely notes that cookies suffer from two main problems: that they were poorly designed to being with, allowing behavior that encourages security weaknesses, and that they are not in sync with the main security mechanisms browsers use today, namely same-origin policy (SOP).
The chapter also details a significant TLS weakness in that that certificate warnings generated often leaves the clueless user to make the correct decision on how to proceed.
Ristic writes that if you receive an alert about an invalid TLS certificate, the right thing to do is immediately abandon the connection attempt. But the browser won’t do that. Browser vendors decided not to enforce TLS connection security; rather they push the problem down to the user in the form of a certificate warning.
The problem is that when a user gets a certificate warning error, they simply don’t know what to do to determine how big of an issue it really is, and will invariably choose to override the warning, and proceed to the website.
The challenge the user face is that these certificate warning errors are pervasive. In 2010, Ristic scanned about 119 million domain names (.com, .net and .org) searching for TLS enables sites. He found that over 22 million or 19% of the sites hosted in roughly 2 million IP addresses. But only about 720,000 had certificates whose names matches the intended hostname.
The chapter also details that the biggest problem with security indicators, similar to the certificate warnings, is that most users don’t pay attention to them and possible don’t even notice them.
As valuable as the first half of the book is, its significance really comes alive starting in chapter 8 on deployment issues. The level of security TLS offers only works when it is deployed correctly, and the book details how to do that. Given that OpenSSL, which is the most widely used SSL/TLS library, is notorious for being poorly documented and difficult to use, the deployment challenges are a significant endeavor.
Another issue with TLS, is that it can create performance issues and chapter 9 provides a lot of insight on performance optimization. The author quotes research from Google that SSL/TLS on their email systems account for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10kb of memory per connection, and less than 2% of the network overheard. The author writes that his goal is to enable the reader to get as close as possible to Google’s performance numbers.
SSL/TLS has a reputation for being slow, but that is more a remnant of years ago when CPU’s were much slower. With better CPU’s and the optimization techniques the book shows, there is no reason not to use TLS.
As noted earlier, OpenSSL is poorly documented. In Bulletproof SSL and TLS, Ivan Ristic has done the opposite: he has written the most readable and insightful book about SSL/TLS to date. TLS is not so difficult to deploy, but incredibly easy to deploy incorrectly. Anyone who is serious about ensuring that their SSL/TLS deployment is effective should certainly read this book.